Draper Bank and Trust Company v. Claudia R. Brown, Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation Enterprises, and Western Surety Company : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
Draper Bank and Trust Company v. Claudia R.
Brown, Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation
Enterprises, and Western Surety Company : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dwight L. King; Attorney for Plaintiff.
David E. Yocum; Terry M. Plant; Attorney for Defendant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Draper Bank and Trust Company v. Claudia R. Brown, Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation Enterprises, and
Western Surety Company, No. 20591.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2073
\ % 
'J.OSfl 
DUUrv&i "*••*-IN T H E S U P R E M E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLAUDIA R. BROWN, BUG PARTS 
UNLIMITED, INC., dba MOTIVATION 
ENTERPRISES, and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20591 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Scott Daniels 
David E. Yocum 
255 East 4th South, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant Claudia R. 
Terry M. Plant 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Western Surety Company 
Dwight L. King 
2121 South State Street, #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondenl 
Draper Bank & Trust Company 
Brown 
SEP 131985 
Ciork, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, . •] 
vs. ' ' ] 
CLAUDIA R. BROWN, BUG PARTS ] 
UNLIMITED, INC., dba MOTIVATION ] 
ENTERPRISES, and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20591 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Scott Daniels 
Dwight L. King 
2121 South State Street, #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Responds 
Draper Bank & Trust Company 
David E. Yocum 
255 East 4th South, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant Claudia R. Brown 
Terry M. Plant 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Western Surety Company 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..'.'. 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT I 
THE DIVERSION OF THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE CONSTITUTED FRAUD ON IT BY 
PAYEES OF THE CASHIER' S CHECK 6 
POINT II 
APPELLANT BECAME LIABLE ON ITS SURETY BOND 
TO RESPONDENT WHEN DEFENDANTS BROWN AND 
MOTIVATION ENTERPRISES DIVERTED THE 
PROCEEDS FROM THE CASHIER'S CHECK TO 
TO PURPOSES OTHER THAN FOR WHICH THEY 
WERE ENTRUSTED 6 , 
CONCLUSION 12 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Anno. §41-3-18 1, 
Utah Code Anno. §41-3-16 6 
Utah Code Anno. §76-6-401 (4) (5) 7 
TEXT 
Corpus Juris Secundum 29A, §1, pg. 2 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) 
CASES 
Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 749 9, 10 
Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc., 
645 P.2d 684 11 
Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 (1956) 10 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, at 875 (1978) 8 
Western Surety Company v. Redding, 626 P.2d 437 10, 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DRAPER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. '] 
CLAUDIA R. BROWN, BUG PARTS ] 
UNLIMITED, INC., dba MOTIVATION ] 
ENTERPRISES, and WESTERN ] 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Appellant. ] 
i CASE NO. 20591 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review on appeal: 
1. Do the undisputed facts provide sufficient support for 
the summary judgment granted respondent against Western Surety 
Company, surety for Claudia R. Brown and Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., 
dba Motivation Enterprises? 
2. Is the conduct of Claudia R. Brown and/or Motivation 
Enterprises as undisputed constitute fraud or fraudulent 
representations or a violation of §41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated? 
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3. Is respondent a person who is within the protection of 
the surety bond furnished by Western Surety Company to the State 
of Utah and covering the dealer Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba 
Motivation Enterprises? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts are undisputed and were presented to the trial 
court by respondent and appellant as undisputed. 
Claudia R. Brown obtained a loan from respondent for the 
purpose of purchasing an automobile particularly described as a 
1978 Porsche 924, Serial No. 1248207902. The proceeds of the 
loan were placed in the form of a cashier's check made payable to 
Claudia R. Brown and Motivation Auto. The proceeds were paid to 
Motivation Enterprises but were diverted by it and never used 
for the purpose of paying the purchase price of the particularly 
described automobile. Other sums never were available to buy 
the automobile, so respondent's security interests were never 
perfected in the security which was to have been provided by the 
1978 Porsche 924. 
Respondent's position is that the diversion of the funds by 
Claudia R. Brown and/or Motivation Enterprises was fraud on its 
rights and that, as a consequence, the appellant, by reason of 
its surety bond, became liable to respondent for the damage 
suffered through loss of its security. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undisputed facts supporting the summary judgment are as 
follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. A bond of motor vehicle dealer or salesman, No. 2334416, 
was in effect on the 9th day of January, 1979 and thereafter until 
the 10th day of May, 1979 under which defendant Western Surety 
Company agreed to indemnify any and all persons, firms and 
corporations for any loss suffered by reason of the fraud or 
fraudulent representations made or through the violation of the 
Motor Vehicle Business Act. The bond covered all judgments and 
costs adjudged against the principal Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., 
dba Motivation Enterprises. A General Agreement of Indemnity 
(pg. 161) shows that Harold Michael Brown was the President of Bug 
Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation Enterprises, and that Claudia 
R. Brown was a co-signer on the General Agreement of Indemnity 
with Harold Michael Brown. 
B. On the 9th of January, 1979, Brown executed a Motor 
Vehicle Security Agreement with Draper Bank & Trust covering a 1978 
Porsche automobile, Model 924, two-door, Serial No. 1238207920 
(R. 164). On the 9th of January, 1979, Claudia Brown entered into 
a promissory note agreement in the face amount of $14,184.72 (R. 165). 
C. On the 9th of January, 1979, plaintiff delivered to 
Claudia Brown its cashier's check No. 46407 made payable to Claudia 
Brown and Motivation Auto in the face amount of $11,500.00. On the 
back thereof is the following endorsement: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes an agreement to 
procure a Utah Certificate of Title to automobile 
for which this check represents payment showing 
Draper Bank & Trust, Draper, Utah as lien holder and 
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also guarantees good and clear title to said automobile 
Make Porsche 924 
Year 1978 
Serial # 1248207920 
(R. 165A) 
The check was endorsed ''Motivation Auto, by C. Brown, Vice Pres." 
and was deposited in the account of Claudia Brown, dba Tac and 
Togs, Inc. 
D. Out of the proceeds of the cashier's check, Claudia 
Brown paid Motivation Auto approximately $11,500.00, the price of 
the Porsche automobile described in the security documents 
(Claudia R. Brown (Conger) deposition, pg. 23). 
E. Motivation Auto did not pay for the price of the Porsche 
automobile but spent the proceeds from its purchase price (Claudia 
R. Brown (Conger) deposition, pg. 25). No title was ever obtained 
to the vehicle. 
F. Subsequent to the payment of the cashier's check, 
Motivation Enterprises resold the Porsche automobile through the 
auction. It retained the sale price without paying Draper Bank & 
Trust the loan which was to be secured by said automobile (Claudia 
R. Brown (Conger) deposition, pg. 25). 
G. Payments amounting to $3,682.55 were paid to Draper Bank 
& Trust on account. There remained due and owing on the note on 
the 25th of March, 1980 the sum of $7,817.45 with interest on 
said sum at the rate of 14% per annum, which equals, as of the 8th 
of February, 1985, a total of $12,976.20. 
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H. Neither Motivation Enterprises nor Brown are able to 
pay the unsecured debt for the purchase price of the Porsche 
(Claudia R Brown (Conger) deposition, pg- 33-34) (Bond cancellation 
May 20, 1979) (R. 163). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment, pursuant to respondent's motion, was 
entered by the Court in the amount of $12,976.20. The judgment 
recites that the conduct of Claudia R. Brown was in fraud of the 
rights of plaintiff as defined by Utah Code Annotated relating 
to bonding of automobile dealers and that the bond required 
appellant to pay the damages caused to plaintiff. 
It is respondent's position and argument that the defendants 
Brown and Motivation Enterprises committed fraud on the respondent 
by diverting the proceeds of the cashier's check furnished by 
respondent to pay the purchase price of the Porsche automobile 
to purposes other than those for which it was intended and for 
which it was entrusted to defendants. The endorsement of the 
check without using the funds for the purposes for which it was 
entrusted by respondent is the fraud claimed by respondent. 
It is the further argument of the respondent that the 
statutes providing for the bonding of automobile dealers 
specifically requires the appellant to pay all damages suffered 
by respondent, and that respondent is within the scope of the 
statute and among those persons whom the bonding statute requires 
the surety to protect. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIVERSION OF THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY DRAPER BANK & 
TRUST FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
CONSTITUTED FRAUD ON IT BY PAYEES OF THE CASHIER'S 
CHECK. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT BECAME LIABLE ON ITS SURETY BOND TO RESPONDENT 
WHEN DEFENDANTS BROWN AND MOTIVATION ENTERPRISES DIVERTED 
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE CASHIER'S CHECK TO PURPOSES OTHER 
THAN FOR WHICH THEY WERE ENTRUSTED. 
POINT I 
THE DIVERSION OF THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY DRAPER BANK & 
TRUST FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
CONSTITUTED FRAUD ON IT BY PAYEES OF THE CASHIER'S 
CHECK. 
Section 41-3-16 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, 
provides for the bonding of all automobile dealers and fixes the 
maximum liability at $20,000.00. It provides that the bond be 
conditioned that the applicant will conduct business as a dealer 
without fraud or fraudulent representations. Section 41-3-18, 
Utah Code Annotated, then provides that there shall be a right of 
action against dealers, salesman, crusher, or surety on bond and 
reads as follows: 
If a person suffers loss or damage by reason of 
fraud, fraudulent representation, or violation of 
this chapter, - - - - such person shall have a 
right of action against the dealer, salesman, or 
crusher guilty of the fraud, fraudulent representation, 
or violation and the sureties upon their respective 
bonds. 
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The undisputed factual situation described for the Court 
shows a clear embezzlement. The funds entrusted were used in a 
manner not authorized by Draper Bank & Trust. Defendants did not 
obtain the title to the vehicle and place on said title the lien 
that Draper had for the automobile purchase price. 
Appellant argues through its brief that there were no 
fraudulent representations by Brownin obtaining the loan from 
respondent. Appellant fails to even consider the fact that fraud 
may occur in many ways other than by false representations. It 
is respondent's position that theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, 
and a whole series of dishonest dealings by an automobile dealer 
may subject its surety to liability if damages are suffered. 
The standard and classical definition of embezzlement is 
set forth in 29A Corpus Juris Secundum, §1, pg. 2, and is as 
follows: 
'Embezzlement1 is broadly defined as the fraudulent 
appropriation of another's property by a person to 
whom it has been intrusted or into whose hands it 
has lawfully come. 
Additional insight into the definition of fraud is found in the 
Criminal Coee, Utah Code Annotated §76-6-401. Subparagraph (4) 
reads as follows: 
'Obtain or exercise unauthorized control' means, but 
if not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore 
defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
Further information on the definitions of fraud is contained in 
subparagraph (5) which defines deception. It reads as follows: 
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'Deception1 occurs when a person intentionally: 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers 
property without disclosing a lien, security 
interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment 
to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is 
not valid or is or is not a matter of official record. 
The undisputed facts show that defendant Brown paid to 
defendant Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation Enterprises, 
the proceeds of the cashier's check as the purchase price of the 
Porsche automobile. Motivation Enterprises did not use those 
proceeds for the purpose of obtaining title to the Porsche and 
this is clearly embezzlement of the funds of respondent which 
were entrusted to Brown and Motivation Enterprises for a specific 
purpose, namely to obtain title to the Porsche. 
It is also undisputed that the Porsche was then sold back 
over the auto auction and its sale price was not used by 
Motivation Enterprises to liquidate the loan which had been 
advanced to pay the purchase price. Respondent submits that 
this kind of dishonest dealing with the proceeds of the cashier's 
check, which was specifically intended to obtain title to the 
Porsche, is the type of fraud that the appellant's surety bond . 
is intended to protect against. 
This Court in Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, at 875 
(1978), defined fraud in the following terms: I 
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the 
multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise 
and are resorted to in order to gain an advantage 
over another. In its general or generic sense, it 
comprises all acts, omissions and concealments 4 
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and 
resulting damage to another. 37 C.J.S. Fraud §1. 
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It is undisputed that Brown paid Motivation Enterprises 
the price of the Porsche and Motivation Enterprises did not 
obtain the title to the Porsche or place on said title the lien 
that all parties understood and agreed was the purpose for which 
the cashier's check proceeds were to be used. It is respectfully 
submitted that this conduct on the part of Brown and/or 
Motivation Enterprises was fraud on the rights of respondent. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT BECAME LIABLE ON ITS SURETY BOND TO RESPONDENT 
WHEN DEFENDANTS BROWN AND MOTIVATION ENTERPRISES DIVERTED 
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE CASHIER'S CHECK TO PURPOSES OTHER 
THAN FOR WHICH THEY WERE ENTRUSTED. 
Respondent was financing the purchase by Brown of the 
Porsche automobile from Motivation Enterprises. It supplied the 
funds through its cashier's check for the purpose of obtaining a 
clear title. Its interests were to be protected by the title 
showing it as a lienholder and by delivery of the title to the 
automobile. Appellant argues that the fraud of Brown was not 
covered by Western Surety's bond. 
The law has always been clear in Utah since the early case 
of Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 749. The surety was 
there held liable to the purchaser of an automobile when his funds 
were not used for the purpose of obtaining title. The facts in 
the Bates case involved two used car dealers, one of whom was 
providing the financing for the purchase from the other dealer. 
The purchaser and the financier relied on the automobile dealer 
to procure the necessary title. When title was not procured, 
the bonding company was held liable to the financier and to the 
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purchaser. The Bates v. Simpson, supra, case is indistinguishable 
from the facts now before the Court as undisputed. 
A subsequent case decided by the Utah Supreme Court holding 
the bond liable when a car dealer failed to obtain title is 
Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 (1956). One of 
the several transactions before the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Lawrence case involved a check made payable to the purchaser of 
the automobile and to the automobile dealer selling the car, 
which check was cashed and collected, as is the situation before 
the Court. When the dealer was unable to deliver title, the 
balance of the purchase price was not paid. The purchaser of the 
automobile claimed forgery on the check. It was held that the 
bonding company was responsible under its dealer's bond. 
Contributory negligence of the bank was held not to be a defense. 
This is a transaction where the dealer was entrusted with the 
check for the purchase price of the automobile. 
This Court in Western Surety Company v. Redding, 626 P.2d 
437, had an occasion to examine the sections of the Utah law 
relating to the requirements that dealers be bonded and the 
right of indemnification by the bonding company where the dealer 
was unable to furnish clear title to an automobile sold in the 
ordinary course of business. The Court examined §41-3-18 Utah 
Code Annotated, which is the section of our motor vehicle law 
requiring bonding of dealers. The Court held: 
This statute should be construed broadly, for the 
bond was intended to protect all persons doing 
business with a motor vehicle dealer. Lawrence v. 
Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 261, 300 P.2d 619 (1956)-
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The holding in Western Surety, supra, was that the dealer 
must then indemnify its surety where loss was sustained and paid 
by the surety. In the present case, there is the indemnification 
agreement executed by both Brown and Harold Michael Brown as 
President of Motivation Enterprises (R. 161). The Western Surety 
v. Redding case, supra, and the indemnification agreement would 
both indicate that appellant has its remedies over against the 
defendants for the amount it is required to pay respondent for 
its losses. 
The most recent case from this Court which involves the 
bonding statute is Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc., 
645 P.2d 684. This case is cited by the appellant in its brief. 
It does not involve the indemnification of a person dealing with 
the automobile dealer as such. The plaintiff there seeking 
indemnification was a creditor of the automobile dealer. The 
Court in its holding stated as follows: 
fA person who engages in the used car business, 
as in any business, must concern himself not alone 
with selling but with all the myriad details 
required to conduct such a business. That each 
part of the business contributes to the total 
success or failure is patent.1 
Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. West, 74 Ariz. 359, 
361, 249 P.2d 830, 832 (1952), In a more recent case, 
Western Surety Co. v. Redding, Utah, 626 P.2d 437, 
439 (1981), this Court emphasized that the bond 'was 
intended to protect all persons doing business with 
a motor vehicle dealer.1 We note that the foregoing 
statement is accurate so long as the motor vehicle 
dealer is himself doing business as a dealer; the 
bond was never intended to indemnify all persons who 
contract with a dealer in a capacity unrelated to his 
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motor vehicle dealership. Consequently, this case is 
reversed and remanded to the district court for a 
trial to determine first, whether the agreements were 
entered into by defendant in connection with its 
business as a licensed motor vehicle dealer and, if so, 
for resolution on the merits. 
It is undisputed that the check from respondent was made 
payable to both Brown and to Motivation Enterprises, the 
automobile dealer, so there can be no question but that respondent 
was dealing with an automobile dealer as such. 
Respondent submits that it is clear that it is within the 
group that is intended by the statutes of the State of Utah cited 
herein to be protected, that its rights were violated by fraud 
as defined and mentioned in the bonding statute, that the trial 
court, on the undisputed facts, correctly ruled that appellant 
is responsible for the damages suffered by respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's summary 
judgment should be affirmed on this appeal. The facts are 
undisputed and the law is clear that the bond is available to 
Draper Bank & Trust Company to indemnify it and pay its damages 
suffered by reason of the fraud committed by defendants Brown 
and/or Motivation Enterprises. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1985. 
' DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
DWIGHT L. KING " 
Attorney for Respondent 
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